



4

GOOGLE THE CHEAT CODE

How to Get Away with Murdering an Unarmed Black Male

William T. Hoston, Randon R. Taylor, and Shaun M. Anderson

Google = Nigger. Coded racially derogatory term used on Twitter.com by President Trump supporters to avoid suspension.¹

Google: Down, Up, Left, Left, A, Right and Down.

The cheat code above, *Down, Up, Left, Left, A, Right and Down*, was the first code in the electronic video game, *Mortal Combat* (1993), which allowed the ability to turn on blood when in combat with an opponent. This cheat code, as well as others that have come out over time, were created by video game designers to enable a player the power to manipulate the game. Such control provides an advantage beyond the intended game regiment.

In the post-cheat code era, the human power to affect electronic video games has morphed into real life games. As an analogy to parallel real life, the *game designers* (i.e., the beneficiaries of White empowerment) have provided a *cheat code* (i.e., institutional and systemic racism and

discrimination embedded in the criminal justice system that views Black males as the most dangerous offenders) for *the players* (i.e., some White law enforcement officers) to make use of biased judgments based on the construction of race, racial feelings toward Black males, and racist law enforcement practices to *win the game* (i.e., the continued deaths of unarmed Black males).

The chapter intends to explore how the institutional and systemic cheat code used by the criminal justice system allows some White law enforcement officers to operate with impunity. This system fails to hold them accountable for the fatal shootings of unarmed Black males. Even with the availability of damning eyewitness video showing these officers in the act, inexplicably the cheat code facilitates the ability for these gatekeepers of the criminal justice system to use their power of discretion to view Black males as a threat and conclude that lethal force is (and was) the most justified course of action. Despite the national attention and conversation delegated to this widespread problem, there continues to be these types of fatal shootings.

Criminal justice activists have argued that the election and presence of President Trump will only exacerbate the problem as he ran for office on a “law and order” and “tough on crime” platform, which supports “stop and frisk.” This could facilitate a police culture that allows officers to be even more aggressive in their interactions with Black males. In his 2000 book, *The America We Deserve*, Trump argued:

Tough crime policies are the most important form of national defense. Government’s number-one job is to ensure domestic tranquillity [sic], and that means tranquilizing the criminal element as much as possible. Aggressive anticrime policies are the best social program (p. 93).

The book forecasted that if he ever became president, Trump would be tough on crime and support proactive policing strategies.

The abandonment of criminal justice reform during the Trump Administration will continue the flurry of disproportionate fatal shootings of unarmed Black males. Executive orders such as the *Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety* (February 9, 2017)² will further empower

some White law enforcement officers and without penalty allow them to utilize the institutional and systemic racism and discrimination embedded in the criminal justice system. As a result, this has prompted us to look at an important element of the problem: *The Cheat Code*.

THE GAME DESIGNERS WHO CREATE THE CHEAT CODE

Michelle Alexander (2010) shows in her acclaimed book, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*, tough approaches to crime mirror that of slavery and are used as a form of social and racial control on Black males. Thus, the question can be asked: Are the deaths of unarmed Black males, according to Alexander (2010) and Sorenson, Marquart, and Brock (1993, p. 417), a form of White supremacy to maintain social and racial order against “persons who live outside the American mainstream, particularly members of minorities”? Without question, it can be argued that the torrent pace of these fatal unarmed deaths is a practice of social and racial control to maintain White empowerment. However, is this argument a valid one?

When the cheat code is used, it is not always to protect White law enforcement officers from the exercise of fatally shooting an unarmed Black male. The institutional and systemic cheat code used by the criminal justice system has many uses in the United States of America (USA). From the first line interaction with law enforcement officers to the racial disparities in sentencing that has led to the mass incarceration of Black males, the cheat code, in general, propels racially disparate treatment of Black Americans and provides an added advantage to employ forms of control detrimental to the humanity of Black males.

Arguably, the cheat code is used most to protect law enforcement officers. Take, for example, in the first three months of 2017 alone. Law enforcement officers shot and killed almost 300 citizens.³ This was more than any time in U.S. history.⁴ In 2016, law enforcement officers shot and killed 963 citizens.⁵ Yet, only a handful of them have been indicted. With this knowledge, we ask the following questions: Why does there continue to be

these types of fatal shootings? Are some White law enforcement officers harboring severe racial feelings to practice such harsh forms of control? Are they the gatekeepers of racialized systems of control? Why do these officers continue to play a role in the livelihood of Black males?

Nearly four decades ago, Bayley and Mendelsohn (1969, p. 109) found in their research, “the police seem to play a role in the life of minority people out of all proportion to the role they play in the lives of the dominant white majority.” The definition of their roles are ever more present today as past studies on the effects of racial biases and stereotypes on policing have found long-standing racial problems among White law enforcement officers who patrol Black, impoverished communities (see Skolnick 1966; Smith and Gray 1985; Graef 1989; Reiner 2010). Some of these officers harbor racial feelings, which include biases and stereotypes that compromise the duties and responsibilities of their position (Graef 1989; Reiner 1991). And despite tremendous efforts to recruit Black enforcement officers to offset these standing biases and stereotypes (Skogan and Frydl 2004), the “White, masculine, heterosexual” prototype of law enforcement officials continues to occupy the majority of police departments around the country (Myers, Forest, and Miller 2004, p. 18).

The racial imbalance of White law enforcement officers leads them to patrol areas with a high concentration of Black residents. Subsequently, this has generated a substantial body of research during recent decades that examines the disproportionate effects of harboring racial attitudes and feelings, police harassment, racial profiling, discrimination in arrests, and in some cases, deadly force against Black males, which all collectively are observed as overpolicing. These patterns of systemic racial discrimination, according to Skolnick (1994, pgs. 51-63), are a part of the police culture. He indicates that law enforcement officers develop a habit of stereotyping young Black males as “symbolic assailants,” who are individuals that have a high propensity to commit crimes (Skolnick 2007). Stuart Hall et al. (2013), in their book, *Policing the Crisis*, also found that pre-existing beliefs regarding the criminality of Blacks lead to overpolicing.

Jerome Skolnick (1966) was the first to argue that the “culture of policing” and its variations shape the norms and values of officers exiting the police academy. Law enforcement officers accept behaviors seen as unlawful by the public as a necessary norm. After exiting the police academy, their

attention is directed toward the symbolic assailant. The problem herein lies when the institutional norms and values of the police culture frame those who are Black and male as the most dangerous offenders. Because law enforcement officers are the first line of the criminal justice system, the perpetual stereotyping of Black males that make them targets of institutional and systemic practices is problematic.

THE PLAYERS

In recent years, law enforcement officers have taken advantage of the exclusive benefits of the cheat code. Much research has focused on law enforcement officer's use of deadly force. A number of these studies have shown that Blacks are more likely than other races and ethnicities to be shot by law enforcement officers (see Fyfe 1978, 1982; Sorenson, Marquart, and Brock 1993; Jacobs and O'Brien 1998; MacDonald et al. 2001; Plant and Peruche 2005; Correll et al. 2007). The recent fatal shooting deaths of unarmed Black males have reintroduced the racial perception of "shooter bias." E. Ashby Plant and B. Michelle Peruche (2005), in their study of law enforcement officers' decisions to shoot Black and White criminal suspects in a computer simulation, found that officers of all races and genders were more likely to accidentally shoot unarmed Black male suspects than White male suspects. In a similar study, Correll et al. (2007), in their study of racial bias in the decision to shoot, found that officers who worked in areas with a large minority population were more likely to show racial biases against unarmed Black suspects. In general, officers were no more likely to shoot either an unarmed White or Black suspect. However, such shootings were more likely to occur in the minority areas that contained a Black populace.

In a later study of shooter bias, Miller, Zielaskowski, and Plant (2012) found that White law enforcement officers in computer-simulated tasks mistakenly shoot unarmed Black male suspects more than White male suspects. Their findings pinpoint cultural stereotypes as the determinant of shooter bias. White officers who perceived Black male suspects as interpersonal threats were more likely to mistakenly shoot. James, Klinger, and Vila (2014), in their study of racial and ethnic bias in decisions to shoot, also found that participants of the study perceived unarmed Black suspects to be a greater threat than unarmed White or Hispanic suspects. Those

in the study held subconscious biases that associated Blacks with being a threat. Despite holding such biases, when compared to Whites and Hispanics, participants initially delayed their decision to shoot Blacks before proceeding. This behavioral counter-bias could be attributed to the national attention aligned with the shooting death of Michael Brown during the time of the study. Because their study only included non-police participants, results are not generalizable to sworn law enforcement officers.

Coupled with the study of shooter bias, contextual and situational factors are also used as determinants to justify police use of deadly force (White 2001; Sun, Payne, and Wu 2008; Lee et al. 2010). Michael D. White (2001), in his study of controlling police decisions to use deadly force, concludes that neighborhood contextual factors play a significant role in the calculation of deadly force. Depending on the rate of violent crimes in the neighborhood, such factors make officers more likely to exert a greater level of force. Because Black neighborhoods are typically perceived as the most violent, the majority of unarmed Black shootings occur in these contexts, further supporting the findings of Correll et al. (2007).

Perhaps the most significant determinant is police-citizen interaction. Certain law enforcement officers will stereotype potential dangers based on situational interactions with members of the neighborhood (White 2001). These interactions can have life-altering consequences. For example, in the cases of Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, Walter Scott, Sam DuBose, Alton Sterling, Philando Castile, and Terence Crutcher, the way the officers perceived each situation was vital in determining the appropriate level of force. Context, along with situational factors, commands professional competence through community specific training. If not, cases will persist where there is the potential for an inevitable clash when racially biased, unprofessional, incompetent White law enforcement officers are assigned to patrol Black neighborhoods.

WIN THE GAME

Let's apply the institutional and systemic cheat code to the case of Walter Scott to show how it empowers the players (see Table 4.1). On April 4, 2015, a White law enforcement officer from North Charleston, S.C., Michael Slager, shot and killed an unarmed Black motorist, Walter Scott, in

the back as he ran away from the officer. The incident was captured on cellphone video by a bystander, Feidin Santana, which continued a national conversation on the fatal shootings of unarmed Black males in the USA.

CHART 4.1: The Cheat Code for the Death of Walter Scott

<i>Down</i> —On April 4, 2015, White law enforcement officer, Michael Slager, shoots an unarmed Black male, Walter Scott, in the back as Scott ran away.
<i>Up</i> —Slager dropped his Taser near Scott’s body planting evidence to suggest that Scott was in possession of the electronic stun gun. He told two lieutenants and the police chief that Scott had taken his Taser and pointed it at him.
<i>Left</i> —Jury composition during trial consisted of six White men, five White women, and one Black man; the defense struck nine potential jurors, including seven minorities. According to the Clerk of Court in Charleston County, 16 Blacks were initially chosen for jury duty.
<i>Left</i> —Slager testifies that Scott posed an imminent threat.
<i>A</i> —One single White male juror believes the legal definition of the charges does not warrant a conviction despite compelling evidence.
<i>Right</i> —The single White male juror sends a note to Third Circuit Judge Clifton Newman that he could not “in good conscience approve a guilty verdict.”
<i>Down</i> —The judge declares a mistrial because there was not a unanimous decision in the case.

Prior to the shooting, Slager had pulled Scott over for a traffic infraction—one that should have never happened in the first place. Slager can be heard saying from the dashcam video that, “The reason for the stop is that your third brake light’s out.”⁶ In fact, Scott’s vehicle was in full compliance with South Carolina Law. Therefore, the stop should have never occurred. For this reason, the rhetorical question is, why did Slager pull Scott over in the first place?

During the traffic stop, the two men, Slager and Scott, can be seen talking from the dashcam video. Slager asked Scott for his driver’s license and questioned him about car-related documentation before Scott fled, and a chase ensued. While out of range of the dashcam, there was an off-camera confrontation. During this confrontation, Slager fired his taser six times in

67 seconds in the direction of Scott. On the witness stand during the trial, Slager said he shouted to Scott, “Taser, Taser, Taser” while using the electronic stun gun.⁷ He explained that a confrontation began when attempting to handcuff Scott. During the handcuffing process, Slager claimed that Scott was able to gain control of the Taser and point it at him. Even after the shooting, Slager told two lieutenants and the police chief that Scott had taken his taser and pointed it at him. Despite these claims, cellphone video of the fatal shooting by Santana shows that the physical encounter between Slager and Scott must have been brief. While holding back tears, Slager told the courtroom, “In my mind was fear. I was scared.”⁸

This chain of events led Slager to open fire on Scott. He is then seen in the video raising his gun and shooting Scott eight times in the back at a distance of 17 feet. Slager said during his testimony, “I fired until the threat was stopped, like I’m trained to do.”⁹ At the end of the video, Slager drops his Taser near Scott’s body to infer that Scott was in possession of it when shot to death.

Does it matter what was happening before the bystander, Feidin Santana, began recording? The defense team for Slager argued during the trial that the video did not tell the complete story that led up to the fatal shooting. Is it not enough proof that we observed during the video Scott running away from Slager? Is it not enough proof that we observed Slager in a shooting position with his .45-caliber Glock handgun? Is it not enough proof that Slager fired his weapon eight times? Is it not enough proof that we observed Slager on video dropping his Taser near Scott’s body? Is it not enough proof that Scott is dead?

Can an unarmed Black male who is 17 feet away pose an imminent threat? From the video, Scott did not present an imminent threat, but rather, it appeared to be an example of police aggression on the part of Slager. Could this have stemmed from his racial bias toward Black males? From George Zimmerman, the neighborhood watch patrolman who shot and killed 17-year-old Trayvon Martin and was acquitted of all charges, to Slager, aggressive law enforcement strategies carried out in large by White law enforcement officers toward unarmed Black males has become, and continues to be, a societal and cultural norm.

To compound matters, a jury consisting of six White men, five White women, and one Black man heard Slager’s testimony. During the jury se-

lection, the defense struck nine potential jurors, including seven minorities. According to the Clerk of Court in Charleston County, from a pool of 75 qualified jurors, 55 were White, 16 were Black, and the rest were from other minority groups. We know race was central to this case, but yet, a substantial number of Black jurors were not chosen.

The jury heard testimony from 55 witnesses during the trial. The selected jurors in the case had three options: (1) a guilty verdict of murder, (2) voluntary manslaughter, or (3) an acquittal. In the state of South Carolina, a murder conviction can lead to 30 years to life in prison. But after the five weeks of trial, hearing all of the evidence, and 22 hours of deliberation over four days, the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. The jury's foreman, Dorsey Montgomery II, who was the only Black juror on the panel, had to deliver the news to the judge. According to Montgomery II, in a *Today Show* interview, most of the jurors were in agreement that Slager was guilty, five jurors were still undecided but leaning toward a guilty verdict, and one was deadlocked: A White male. Montgomery II indicated that the single White male juror had his "own convictions."¹⁰

Montgomery II presented a note to prominent Black Third Circuit Judge Clifton Newman in which the single White male juror wrote that he could not "in good conscience approve a guilty verdict" and would not change his mind.¹¹ The note continued, "We all struggle with the death of a man and with all that has been put before us...I still cannot convict the defendant. At the same time my heart does not want to tell the Scott family that the man who killed [Walter Scott] ... is innocent. But with the choices, I cannot and will not change my mind."¹² Soon after, the judge declared a mistrial.

The sad reality is that it is difficult to police the White imagination (pun intended). For it fears Black males and seldom renders conviction against White law enforcement officers. The single White male juror, who could not find Slager guilty, created an atmosphere of doubt. This much is clear because Montgomery II indicated that five other jurors felt Slager was guilty. However, they had not made a final decision. Why is this? This is because the single White male juror was adamant that Slager was not guilty of murder or the lesser charge of manslaughter. The psychology of persuasion by a White male objecting to the presented evidence to a majority-White jury, asking for more clarification of the legal definitions of the charges, along with the "He is one of us" theory to describe Slager, cre-

ated an atmosphere that allowed his harden attitude to influence those with soft attitudes. What were the conversations like among the jurors? Think about the concealed conversations that led up to the single White male juror writing the note directly to the judge.

There were eleven White jurors in a room with compelling evidence. They were only being held accountable by the presence of one lone Black juror, who was appointed as the jury's foreman by the Black judge, to somehow imply that racial discrimination did not take place in the selection process and his presence as leader could render fairness. One can only imagine if the jury was all White. There may not have been any deliberation at all.

CONCLUSION

The outcome of the Slager case was all too familiar to Black Americans. Although we are supposed to be, "innocent until proven guilty" in a court of law, it is usually, "guilty until proven innocent." This is especially true in the era of dead Black males unable to take the stand in their own trials. And time and time again, we are left to pick up the pieces trying to understand how the criminal justice system finds vindication for some White law enforcement officers but no justice for dead Black males.

The quantity and quality of the evidence presented in the case warranted a conviction. The facts were so inhumanly grotesque that the spirit of Scott should haunt the single White male juror forever. The juror was privileged to the following evidence: (1) video footage, (2) information of Slager's original attorney withdrawing counsel because he had knowledge of Slager lying to the police department, (3) Slager being fired from his position on the police force, (4) the city settling with the Scott family for \$6.5 million, (5) independent investigations by the FBI, the U.S. Attorney in South Carolina, the U.S. Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, and the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) who all found Slager at fault, and (6) federal charges levied against Slager for obstruction of justice because he intentionally mislead the initial investigation. With all of this evidence, the single White male juror still used the cheat code to protect Slager. Let me repeat, with all of this information, he still used the cheat code. His civic duty as a member of the jury, an extension of the American judicial system chosen to

grant due process to his peers, was to do the right thing and find Slager guilty. Instead, he reciprocated to Slager what the beneficiaries of White empowerment often denounce on a continual basis but comfortably live within the context of *it* every single day of their lives: White privilege.

At the end of the day, the single White male juror wrote to the Black judge that his “conscience” kept him from finding Slager guilty. The word “conscience” in this context was a subliminal falsehood that operated to stand in the way of justice. His inner Whiteness did not act as a moral guide to do a historical good for the memory of Scott and other fatally shot unarmed Black males in recent years. But rather through his “conscience,” the juror contributed to safeguarding the structure of White supremacy, maintained the design and intent of White privilege, and further authorized White law enforcement officers who act aggressively toward unarmed Black males the discretion to continue such practices. The same inner voice that told him he could not render a guilty verdict mirrors the inner voice that told Slager to shoot unarmed Scott when he was still deemed a threat at 17 feet away. This misguided “conscience” allowed the single White male juror to use the cheat code to manipulate the game of life and provide an advantage to one of the game’s highest scorers: White law enforcement officers.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. In what ways has the culture of policing had an undesired harmful effect on police accountability?
2. Is meaningful criminal justice reform possible during the Trump Administration?

WEB EXERCISE

1. Access the *Killed By Police* database. Go to: Killedbypolice.net. Compare the years of 2017, 2016, and 2015. Have the number of deaths committed by law enforcement officers become “normalized”? Why do you believe that some White law enforcement officers who have killed Black male citizens received impunity?

REFERENCES

- Alexander, M. 2010. *The new Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness*. New York: The New Press.
- Bayley, D.H., and H. Mendelsohn. 1969. *Minorities and the police: Confrontation in America*. New York: Free Press.
- Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., Wittenbrink, B., Sadler, M. S., and T. Keesee. 2007. Across the thin blue line: Police officers and racial bias in the decision to shoot. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92(6): 1006–1023.
- Fyfe, J. J. 1978. “Reducing the Use of Deadly Force: The New York Experience,” in U.S. Department of Justice. *Police use of deadly force* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office).
- Fyfe, J. J. 1982. *Readings on police use of deadly force*. Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation.
- Graef, R. 1989. *Talking blues: The police in their own words*. London: Collins Harvill.
- Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J., and B. Roberts. 2013. *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order*, 2nd Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jacobs, D., and R. O’Brien. 1998. The determinants of deadly force: A structural analysis of police violence. *The American Journal of Sociology* 103(4): 837–862.
- James, L., Klinger, D., and B. Vila. 2014. Racial and ethnic bias in decisions to shoot seen through a stronger lens: Experimental results from high-fidelity laboratory simulations. *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 10(3): 323-340.
- Lee, H., Hyunseok, J., Yun, I., Hyeyoung, L., and D.W. Tushaus. 2010. An examination of police use of force utilizing police training and neighborhood contextual factors: A multilevel analysis. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management* 33(4): 681-702.
- MacDonald, J. M., Kaminski, R. J., Alpert, G. P., and A.N. Tennenbaum. 2001. The temporal relationship between police killings of civilians and criminal homicide: A refined version of the danger-perception theory. *Crime and Delinquency* 42(2):155–172.
- Miller, S. L., Zielaskowski, K., and E. A. Plant. 2012. The basis of shooter biases: Beyond cultural stereotypes. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 38(10): 1358-1366.

- Myers, K. A., Forest, K.B., and S.L. Miller. 2004. Officer friendly and the tough cop: Gays and lesbians navigate homophobia and policing. *Journal of Homosexuality* 47(1): 17-37.
- Plant, E. A., and B. M. Peruche. 2005. The consequences of race for police officers' responses to criminal suspects. *Psychological Science* 16(3): 180-183.
- Reiner, R. 1991. *Chief constables*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Reiner, R. 2010. *The politics of the police*, 4th Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Skogan, W., and K. Frydl. 2004. *Fairness and effectiveness in policing: The evidence*. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
- Skolnick, J. H. 1966. *Justice without trial: Law enforcement in Democratic society*, 1st Edition. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
- Skolnick, J. H. 1994. *Justice without trial: Law enforcement in a Democratic society*, 3rd Edition. New York: Macmillan.
- Skolnick, J. H. 2007. Racial profiling – Then and now. *Criminology and Public Policy* 6(1): 65-70.
- Smith, D.J., and J. Gray. 1985. *Police and people in London*. London: Gower.
- Sorenson, J. R., Marquart, J. W., and D. E. Brock. 1993. Factors related to killings of felons by police officers: A test of the community violence and conflict hypotheses. *Justice Quarterly* 10(3): 417-440.
- Sun, I. Y., Payne, B. K., and Y. Wu. 2008. The impact of situational factors, officer characteristics, and neighborhood context on police behavior: A multilevel analysis. *Journal of Criminal Justice* 36(1): 22-32.
- Trump, D. 2000. *The America we deserve*. Los Angeles: Renaissance Books.
- White, M.D. 2001. Controlling police decisions to use deadly force: Re-examining the importance of administrative policy. *Crime and Delinquency* 47(1): 131-151.

NOTES

1. See Prince, S.J. 2016. "Racist 'Trump Twitter' comes out with coded ways to share racial slurs." *Heavy.com*. Available at: <http://heavy.com/news/2016/10/donald-trump-republican-racist-code-words-twitter-google-skype-yahoo-bing-screenshots/2> (October 1).
2. See the details of the executive order, "Task force on crime reduction and public safety." Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/09/presidential-executive-order-task-force-crime-reduction-and-public> (February 09, 2017).

3. For more information, see the 2017 *Washington Post* database of every fatal shooting in the United States by a police officer in the line. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2017>.
4. For more information, see the comprehensive website: <http://killedby-police.net>. This website provides an up-to-date list of people killed by U.S. law enforcement officers.
5. For more information, see the 2016 *Washington Post* database of every fatal shooting in the United States by a police officer in the line. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2016>.
6. See Farias, C. 2015. "Ignorance of the law: A recent Supreme Court ruling allows the kind of traffic stop that led to Walter Scott's death." *Slate.com*. Available at: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/04/why_michael_slager_pulled_over_walter_scott_cops_who_don_t_know_the_law.html (April 14).
7. See Waters, D. 2016. "'I was scared': S.C. officer on trial for murder in shooting of unarmed black man takes the stand." *WashingtonPost.com*. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/11/29/i-was-scared-s-c-officer-on-trial-for-murder-in-shooting-of-unarmed-black-man-takes-the-stand/?utm_term=.a78f1ff3fde1 (November 29).
8. *Ibid*, 'I was scared': S.C. officer on trial for murder in shooting of unarmed black man takes the stand
9. *Ibid*, 'I was scared': S.C. officer on trial for murder in shooting of unarmed black man takes the stand
10. See Finley, T. 2016. "Black juror in Walter Scott case opens up about mistrial." *HuffingtonPost.com*. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/black-juror-walter-scott-mistrial_us_584ace2ee4b0bd9c3dfc5b37 (December 9).
11. See Hersher, R. 2016. "Jury in S.C. police shooting trial says it is struggling to reach verdict." *NPR.org*. Available at: <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/12/02/504160304/jury-in-s-c-police-shooting-trial-says-it-is-struggling-to-reach-verdict> (December 2).
12. *Ibid*, Jury In S.C. police shooting trial says it is struggling to reach verdict